A couple days ago the Denver Post printed a story about a Plane Crash near Denver.  The following is an excerpt from that article, which a link to has been provided at the bottom of this post.

"Jay Loar, an Erie resident who was goose hunting in an adjacent field, said he saw the plane circle once earlier in the morning and climb steeply into a "stall" maneuver, wherein the plane's engine stalls on the ascent and comes back on during the swift descent."

Reporting like illustrates the types of myth that are perpetuated by the media, the general public, and even some second rate flight instructors.  I can't even count the number of times a new student was fearful of the engine quitting during a stall because they had heard a story like this before.

Setting the record straight...

A stall is an aerodynamic event where progressively increasing angle of attack (raising the nose) results in seperation of airflow from the top of the wing.  A stall has absolutely nothing to do with the engine.  As another instructor (Sandy Hill) put it... "Birds and Gliders can also stall, but neither have an engine."

Recovery from a stall is as simple as lowering the nose of the aircraft, which decreases the angle of attack of the wing, and returns smooth airflow to the top of the wing to restore lift.

If there could ever be a major aviation accident that could be considered humorous, Continental Airlines flight 1943 would definitely be the one.  In February of 1996, a Douglass DC-9 landed in Houston Texas with the wheels still retracted.  All passengers escaped the aircraft without injury.  This accident illustrates several key CRM concepts, and how a failure of leadership resulted in an accident unlike most aviation accidents.

Below is a link to my humble opinion on this classic accident.  On that page you'll also find a link to the full NTSB report that includes the cockpit voice recorder transcripts.

Hope you enjoy reading about this event, as I have certainly enjoyed reading and studying about it myself.

Continental Airlines Flight 1943

Continental Airlines flight 1943 illustrates a unique CRM problem unlike that of most aviation accidents.  In February of 1996, the crew of a Douglass DC-9 accidentally landed gear-up in Houston, Texas.  Unlike most crews involved in accidents, this crew was very friendly, they liked each other, and they appeared to cooperate and communicate well.  The missing element therefore was something else.  To illustrate this problem I’ll refer to the following “trite little scientific equation” that a CRM instructor introduced me to. The equation is written as professionalism + niceness + teamwork = safety.

The crew appeared to communicate and interact in a positive manner, i.e. they were nice to each other.  Both pilots appeared to be functioning as a team (that is until the last 30 seconds!)  The primary missing element, therefore, was professionalism.  In the analysis of the CVR, it is my opinion that the captain set precedence for lack of professionalism and the first officer followed his lead.  By the strictest CRM definitions this would be a failure to set boundaries and define roles and norms, both for himself and for his crew.  Probably the most glaring example of this lack of professionalism is the lack of adherence to the 10,000 foot sterile cockpit rule.  Even as they flew down the glide slope at 3,000 feet the captain was still chatting about how his tennis plans would be messed up by the weather.

This lack of professionalism resulted in the pilots being less focused on the task of flying the airplane than they should have been.  The lack of focus, the breakdown of the sterile cockpit, and the captain’s preoccupation in personal issues of tennis resulted in the in-range check not being completed.  This checklist included activation of hydraulic pressure, which never occurred, resulting in the flaps, slats, spoilers, and landing gear not functioning. 

On two occasions there was talk about the flaps not functioning, however neither pilot tried to determine the cause, and no one ever verified that the landing gear was down and locked.  As the flight continued to the critical phase of landing, the first officer was flying and he voiced concerns several times about the aircraft’s speed, the fact that there were no flaps, and the un-stabilized nature of the approach.  The first officer asked for a go-around, however the captain rejected the request.  Instead of listening to the first officers concerns, the captain instead assumed control of the aircraft through a positive change of control, and proceeded to land the aircraft at 193 knots – 80 knots faster than normal without gear, flaps, slats, or spoilers. 

There is a fundamental concept I mentioned in an earlier paper, and it begs being repeated for this accident.  The concept was that it’s my belief that if either pilot calls missed then the flight should go missed, and if either pilot calls go-around then there should be a go-around.  I believe in these last few minutes there was a breakdown of the teamwork, the first officer advocated a safer course of action, the captain insisted continuing the present course.  The captain should have had enough respect for his first officer to think that perhaps he was aware of something that he wasn’t, and perhaps the go-around was a good idea.

In the end, it was the lack of professionalism that resulted in this accident.  To me the CVR illustrates an absolutely shocking lack of professionalism.  From the time they were 30 minutes out in cruise, to the time they touched down there were no reading of checklists, referencing of airspeeds, verbal calls of any nature.  Neither pilot had good situational awareness of the condition of the plane, or its configuration.

The failing of this captain is that he did not set boundaries, establish roles, or convey a norm of professionalism to his first officer.  First officers to some extent need to be adaptive to the style of the captain, and that is exactly what this first officer did, he followed his captain’s bad example.  Had this first officer decided to mentally be the leader of the team and maintain his own vigilance over the flight, the captain most likely would have followed his lead since they were friendly towards each other.  To some extent, the first officer did this towards the end, but by that time it was too late.  The first officer is there to observe and check the work of the captain, and this first officer was not doing his job either.